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1. INTRODUCTION 
Probabilistic methods and procedures are becoming more 
common in the analysis and design of structural members, and 
are especially useful when evaluating failed structures such 
as transmission line structures. These techniques allow the 
designer to account for the uncertainty associated with 
material and geometric parameters such as structure height, 
cross-sectional area of the pole, thickness of the pole, 
distance between bracing, and material yield strength. 
1.1 History of Recent Failures 
Recently in Mid-Iowa transmission lines failed twice 
because of severe ice storms which involved H-frame hollow 
tubular steel structures. The first ice storm occurred in 
early spring of 1990, when a portion of the Lehigh-Sycamore 
345-kv electric transmission line was damaged, resulting in 
structural failures of 68 transmission structures (1]. Figure 
1.1 shows the damaged portion of the line and its location. 
On March 7, 1990, the southwest and central parts of Iowa 
experienced a severe ice storm that caused large amounts of 
ice to accumulate on the conductors. The amount of ice on the 
conductors recorded on the following morning, 14 hours later 
and at 40 degrees F, was approximately 1.25 to 1.5 in. (1]. 
Static, dynamic and buckling analyses using a three-
dimensional, finite element computer model were performed to 
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Fig. 1.1: Damaged portion of the Lehigh-Sycamore transmission line and 
its location. 
"' 
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determine possible failure scenarios and the line failure load 
[1]. The finite element analysis included both geometric and 
material nonlinear behavior of the system and was executed on 
the Electric Power Research Institute's TLWorkstation (module 
ETADS) finite element analysis software [2]. However, these 
analyses were conducted based on the assumption that the 
material and geometric parameters were deterministic 
quantities; not accounting for any variabilities that exist in 
the actual structure. 
Structural analysis revealed that the transmission line 
failure could have initiated somewhere between 1.5 to 1.75 in. 
of ice load. On the basis of the analysis results, field 
observations, and hypothesis, two possible failure scenarios 
leading to the collapse of the transmission line were 
established. 
In the first scenario, the study suggested that initial 
failure of one of the insulators (or its hardware components 
or both the insulator and the hardware components) resulted in 
the separation of the conductor from the tower. Consequently, 
this occurrence caused the loss of the line tension in the 
conductor which finally led to the buckling in a domino 
pattern of the structures from unbalanced longitudinal forces. 
In the second scenario, initial buckling of one of the 
structures was caused by galloping conductor forces at 1.5 in. 
of ice. Galloping of a conductor is a phenomenon usually 
4 
caused by a relatively strong wind blowing on an iced 
conductor (1]. This second scenario was deemed to be less 
likely because of the field observations and analytical 
results. 
The first failure scenario was verified analytically and 
was consistent with evidence from field observations. 
The second ice storm occurred only 18 months later 
beginning on October, 31, 1991, on a different segment of the 
same electric transmission line in which over 30 miles of 
structures collapsed because of the storm (3]. The weather 
conditions resulted in more ice accumulation than the March 7, 
1990 storm and was the most destructive ice storm in Iowa 
history [4]. Investigation is in progress to predict, if 
possible, the cause of the failure (3]. 
As a result of the previous work, the recommendation made 
in Ref. 1 was that "a probabilistic analysis needs to be 
developed that can take into account uncertainty associated 
with design parameters such as material and geometrical 
imperfections and variability in the loading." Incorporating 
the randomness associated with the material and geometric 
parameters as well as the variability in the ice thickness 
allows a more realistic representation of the performance of 
the transmission line structure to be achieved. 
5 
1.2 Objectives 
The objective of this work was to develop a procedure to 
determine the strength of a transmission line structure under 
ice loading by using a probabilistic method. The strength of 
a transmission structure is defined herein by the load which: 
• causes elastic instability of the structure 
• produces forces in a component beyond its capacity 
• results in formation of a mechanism resulting in a 
large rotation. 
The evaluated strength can then be used to develop a fragility 
curve relating the probability of failure to a given ice 
thickness on the conductor (see Fig. 1.2). 
The focus of this work was to accomplish three primary 
objectives: 
1. To outline the basic analysis procedure. 
2. To validate the basic analysis procedure utilizing 
published information. 
3. To demonstrate the procedure on an actual 
transmission line structure. 
1.3 organization of the study 
A literature study was performed to review relevant 
reliability studies. In addition, the statistics and the 
reliability theories used by other research or in 
investigating the performance of the structures was reviewed. 
Next, the basic analysis procedure for the probabilistic 
analysis of transmission line structures was developed. This 
followed the reliability strategies given in Ref. 5, 6, 7, 8. 
6 
Ice thickness 
Fig. 1.2: Typical fragility curve. 
The method was validated by using simple truss and portal 
frame examples. 
Lastly, the procedure was applied to an actual 
transmission structure from the second line failure described 
in Ref. 3. To demonstrate the procedure, the structural 
analysis utilized the ETADS software developed by the Electric 
Power Research Institute (EPRI). This program is a structural 
finite element routine designed for specific application to 
transmission line structures [2]. The software is capable of 
incorporating large displacements and material nonlinearity in 
formulating the structural stiffness matrix. Also, a 
statistical analysis program (SAS) (9] was employed for the 
statistical calculations in conjunction with various developed 
spreadsheets for reliability computations. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
Transmission line structures play a vital role in the 
function of providing electricity to practically every 
household, business and organization.· These structures are 
subjected to many kinds of climatic conditions. In fact, the 
probability is very high that a structure will be under 
extreme stress from exposure to such conditions as ice 
accumulation on the conductors and high winds. Therefore, the 
design objective is to proportion a reliable structure which 
will remain in service and will not require excessive 
maintenance after every storm. Research has been conducted in 
the areas of transmission line structural loads, design 
methodologies and reliability concepts. In the following 
sections, past research conducted in each of these areas is 
briefly discussed. 
2.1 Transmission Line Structural Loading 
In the past, the National Electric Safety Code (NESC) 
(10] has been the primary source in the united States for 
selecting the minimal design loads of transmission line 
structural design. Design loads include dead, climate, 
accident, construction and maintenance loads. The NESC uses 
combinations of loading conditions on the line to calculate 
structural loads which are multiplied by overload factors 
(load factors) to achieve structural safety (10]. 
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Probabilistic methods and procedures are becoming more 
common design tools for steel, concrete and transmission line 
structures. For example, several design techniques for 
transmission lines have been proposed in the past few years to 
utilize probability based climatic loads. Two of these 
reliability based design methods for transmission lines, which 
will be discussed in more detail in the next section, have 
received the most attention and are now available to design 
engineers for trial use [11]. The American Society of Civil 
Engineers (ASCE) [12] and International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) [13] have proposed procedures which are quite 
different in the calculation of the load caused by a climatic 
event. The most significant difference between the two 
techniques c·oncerns the availability of weather data specified 
by each document. The ASCE method uses data that are 
generally available; whereas, the IEC method utilizes data 
that are yet not commonly available, such as extreme wind or 
ice in the region of the line, ice weight per unit length and 
ice shape [11]. The IEC procedure requires the analyst to 
consider several more load combinations than the number 
specified in the ASCE method [11]. 
2.2 Design Methodologies 
As stated above, the NESC has typically been the primary 
source for the minimal design of transmission line structures. 
However, with the advent of reliability based design 
9 
procedures of transmission line structures, the NESC may be 
replaced or updated by procedures incorporating these newer 
probabilistic methods [14]. 
Continuing the comparison of the ASCE and IEC methods of 
reliability design, the ASCE method utilizes procedures for 
sizing different structural components based on predefined 
target reliability levels. On the other hand, the IEC 
technique focuses on a system-based concept and does not 
provide specific guidance for the design of the individual 
components. According to Ref. 11, the ASCE method is easier 
and more straight forward to implement than the IEC procedure. 
The IEC and ASCE definition of system is another key 
difference between the two concepts. When ASCE uses the term 
system, the reference is to one transmission line structure. 
Hence, when ASCE refers to system reliability, the reference 
is only to the reliability of a single transmission structure. 
However, the IEC definition of the system refers to the entire 
transmission line. Therefore, the term system reliability 
refers to the transmission line including all the structures 
supporting the line. 
Using the IEC definition of system, system reliability 
concepts in the design of transmission line structures may 
include hundreds of miles and must consider several loading 
combinations. Among these cases are the wind and ice 
loadings. Unfortunately, no reliable statistics describing 
10 
the variation in these loads would be known prior to the 
occurrence of a failure event. This causes difficulties and 
uncertainties in the calculation of reliability of the line 
being investigated. 
2.3 Reliability Background 
The following summarizes the basic reliability 
principals, calculations of failure probabilities, as well as 
some of the previously published techniques to analyze 
transmission line structures using probabilistic methods. 
2.3.1 Limit state functions 
Reliability of a system is defined as the probability 
that the system is safe to withstand an applied load or loads. 
However, the probability of failure for a system has been more 
common in describing the performance of a structure. 
Determination of the probability of failure begins with 
definition of the limit state functions of the system. 
The limit state function is described as the conditions 
beyond which the system cannot perform the function for which 
it was designed. These conditions can either pertain to 
safety or performance depending on the limit state under 
consideration. In other words, a limit state represents only 
one failure mode of the system, and sometimes several limit 
states can be involved in the calculation of the probability 
of failure for one system. 
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For the specific case of the transmission line structure, 
the structure is designed for the function of supporting the 
conductors, which are attached to the structure by an 
insulator assembly. For clarification, the insulator 
assembly is shown in Fig. 2.1. 
Some examples are listed below of the transmission 
structure failure modes where it fails to serve its purpose in 
supporting the conductors: 
• elastic instability of the structure 
• forces in a component beyond its capacity 
• formation of a mechanism resulting in a large rotation 
that results in a collapse of the transmission 
structure. 
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Each type of failure listed above constitutes a different 
limit state. 
The limit state function, G, is based on the difference 
between the random structural resistance variable, R, and the 
load variable, Q, which is numerically shown as: 
G = R{x)-Q (2. 1) 
where xi represent the geometric and material parameters that 
are used to evaluate the resistance, R. More details 
concerning the procedure used in this work will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
2.3.2 Levels of analysis 
Once the limit states are stated in terms of the 
variables, xi, the calculation of the probability of failure 
is accomplished on one of three levels. Each level has a 
progressively higher level of sophistication with respect to 
the analysis procedure. In the following, discussion will 
progress from the highest level (level 3) to the lowest level 
(level 1). The highest level is the most complete and 
accurate representation of the computation of the probability 
of failure. 
2.3.2.1 Level 3: reliability analysis 
At level 3, the probability of failure is measured by a 
multidimensional integration of the joint probabilities of the 
resistance and load. Letting fR(r) characterize the density 
13 
fR(r). fq(q) 
Load, Q Resistance, R 
p1 = P(R<Q) ~ r,q 
Fig. 2.2: Fundamental reliability problem. 
function of the resistance, and fQ(q) denote that density 
function of the load, the integration of the following 
equation results in the exact probability of failure: 
• q 
Pt=P(Rs.Q) = J fo(q) J fR(r) drdq (2. 2) 
The graphical representation of the probability distributions 
of the resistance and the load is shown in Fig. 2.2, with the 
14 
area portraying the probability of failure, Pf r also being 
indicated. 
This computation requires full knowledge of the 
distribution functions and is extremely difficult to evaluate; 
the complexity of this computation even renders many cases 
impossible to evaluate. For this reason, Monte Carlo 
simulation methods are more common. These methods simulate 
finite values of the resistance and load to find the 
probability of failure utilizing computer analysis. However, 
this approach requires a large number of runs (3000 to 4000, 
according to Ref. 16) to produce a statistically reliable 
probability of failure, which may be very time consuming. 
2.3.2.2 Level 2: reliability analysis 
Due to the deficiencies of level 3, level 2 methods make 
assumptions and simplifications in order to make the 
calculation of the probability of failure easier. The 
sacrifice of making these simplifications results in an 
approximate value for the probability of failure. The essence 
of level 2 methods entail checking a finite number of points 
(usually only one point at the mean values of the variables) 
on the limit state function surface. For comparison, level 3 
involves checking of all points along the entire surface of 
the limit state function. 
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2.3.2.3 Level 1: reliability analysis 
Level 1 entails the most simplistic approach of all 
three. This approach encompasses design and safety checking 
methods, because only a single characteristic value is 
connected to each variable. In actuality, no probability of 
failure calculations are performed; so level 1 methods are not 
really methods of reliability analysis (8]. However, level 1 
operational methods provide engineers with a basis for design 
code provisions. 
Level 2 balances the disadvantages and benefits involved 
in the calculation of the probability of failure better than 
the other levels; accordingly, it is the focus of. this 
research. Within level 2, the particular method that will be 
applied to this work is the First Order-Second Moment (FOSM) 
method. 
2.3.3 Reliability analyses of transmission line structures 
Due to the different reliability levels of analysis and 
various methods available within each level, numerous 
reliability methods have been applied to the analyses of 
transmission line structures. Details of some of these 
methods will be discussed in this section. 
2.3.3.1 Reliability relationship between line and 
structure 
The system reliability may refer to the entire 
transmission line encompassing miles of transmission 
16 
structures, or to a single transmission line structure. In 
the first case, the reliability analysis must not only 
consider the variation of the load processes that affect the 
line, but also the spatial correlations within and among these 
load processes. 
A method for relating the reliability of these two 
aspects of system, (the transmission line and the transmission 
structure), has been developed by Dagher, Kulendran, Peyrot, 
and Maamouri [15). This method calculates the probability of 
failure of a line segment, PFL, as 
PFL = a (N/n) PFs 
where, 
PFs= probability of failure of a structure, 
a = system reliability usage factor, 
N= total number of structures in line segment, and 
(2. 3) 
n= number of structures simultaneously subjected to the 
same extreme climatic event. 
This relationship accounts for the spatial extent of the 
extreme loading events within the system reliability usage 
factor, a. The factor, a, is obtained in this source by using 
Monte Carlo simulation for extreme wind and extreme ice 
loadings. 
This analysis was able to use available weather data to 
estimate the probability of failure of the line by converting 
the problem from an event-based formulation to an extreme 
value analysis. 
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2.3.3.2 Monte Carlo example 
Level 2 techniques are most frequently implemented, but 
level 3 is often employed when Monte Carlo simulations are 
needed to validate level 2 methods. 
A censoring technique for Monte Carlo simulations was 
proposed by Kamarudin [16] that reduced the number of 
simulations, and thus reduced the cost and time involved in 
analysis. The benefit of the censoring technique is the 
ability to determine if individual trials are failures or 
survivals without going through the structural calculations. 
The amount of savings involved with this procedure is 
variable, but may be as much as a 30% reduction of the amount 
of computations. Kamarudin tested this technique on a wood 
pole design. 
This technique involved checking the resistance of the 
structure during each trial and deciding if further structural 
calculations were required. If the resistance satisfied a 
predetermined check-point criteria, then it was counted as a 
non-failure. This check-point is located on the failure 
probability distribution (see Fig. 2.3) at line a-a. The area 
to the right of the line a-a was considered as the "High 
Strength Area". When the resistance was located in this area, 
it satisfied the pre-determined check-point, and the 
simulation counted as a non-failure. 
This procedure was applied to a wood pole design with no 
18 
Load, Q Resistance, R 
.. 
,...-.---.._ 
~. 
"High Strength Area" 
Pr= P(R<Q) ~ r,q 
Fig. 2.3: Location of "High strength Area" on failure 
probability distribution curves. 
reduction in accuracy compared to an identical simulation that 
was performed without the censoring technique. 
2.3.3.3 Finite element example 
The next procedure utilizes the First Order-Second Moment 
(FOSM) method to calculate the probability of transmission 
line structural failure for a single structure. This method 
was applied to a 2-D transmission line tower with loading in 
the both the in-plane (vertical) and out-of-plane (horizontal) 
directions. 
A.K. Haldar (17] proposed a finite element method which 
defined failure as a force in a member beyond its capacity. A 
member was specified as one of the components within an 
19 
individual transmission structure. 
The equations used for the horizontal and vertical 
loadings due to combined wind and ice at the conductor 
attachment points are listed below: 
where, 
PH= 
Pv= 
de= 
t= 
GF= 
Co= 
v= 
WN= 
we= 
WT= 
horizontal load, 
vertical load, 
diameter of conductor, 
ice thickness, 
span reduction factor, 
drag coefficient, 
wind velocity, 
wind span, 
bare weight of conductor, and 
weight span. 
(2. 4) 
(2. 5) 
The finite element method utilized a first-order Taylor's 
series expansion to find the mean internal stress, s, and the 
standard deviation of the internal stress, as, of each member 
in the transmission structure. The mean internal strength, 
R, was then derived from standard mechanics of materials 
equations, and the standard deviation of the internal 
strength, aR, was assumed. 
A normal distribution was also assumed for these 
variables, (S, R, as, aR), which were then used to calculate 
the probability of failure, Pf ,i' of each member of the 
transmission structure by the following equation: 
where B is defined as the reliability index and ~(-B) can be 
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=cj>[-(R-8)] =cj>(-~) 
../a~+a2s 
obtained from the standard normal table (17]. 
(2. 6) 
Then the Pf,i's were combined to· form lower and upper 
bounds, assuming total independence and total dependence, 
respectively, on the probability of failure of the structure 
in the next equation: 
(2. 7) 
where Pf is the probability of failure of the structure, and M 
is the number of failure modes, or in this case, the number of 
members of the transmission structure. 
This procedure was applied to an example transmission 
structure and sensitivity studies of the various input 
statistical parameters (e.g., loading, strength and sectional 
properties) were performed. One of the results of the 
analyses indicated that the failure probability of the 
structure increased by taking into account the effects of 
correlation between wind speed and ice thickness. 
2.3.3.4 Plastic collapse failure example 
A method proposed by Murotsu, Okada, Matsuzaki, and 
Nakamura (18] was specifically generated for the failures 
produced by large nodal displacements due to plastic collapse 
of the structure. This method was applied to a 2-D 
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transmission line structure similar to the structure in the 
previous example. 
The load equations for this method were given for wind, 
snow and tension loads, in which the wind load, Lw' and snow 
load, Ls, are listed below: 
where, 
p= 
G= 
v= 
Co= 
D= 
t= 
S= 
H= 
Pe= 
L,, = ~p(Gv) 2 CD (D+2t) S (H/lO) Y' 
air density, 
gust factor, 
winter average wind speed at site of structure, 
drag coefficient, 
conductor diameter, 
snow thickness, 
span length, 
height at which wind acts, and 
snow density. 
(2. 8) 
(2. 9) 
The tension loads, LT, were determined by solving a non-linear 
equation which accounted for a maximum allowable stress of 
conductors , wind speed, snow thickness and temperature. 
Then the horizontal and vertical loads acting on the 
conductor at its attachment point to the arms of the structure 
were calculated from Lw, Ls, LT, and the angle of the 
conductors with respect to the surrounding structures. 
A structural analysis using the direct displacement 
method was performed. For the given failure criteria and a 
transmission line structure with many degrees of redundancy, 
structural fa i lure results only after the yielding of sever al 
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components within the transmission structure. To de.termine 
the system failure probability, one must investigate all 
possible failure mechanisms. However, this seems impractical 
to include all of these mechanisms, particularly in a highly 
redundant structure. Therefore, a procedure was used which 
selected the probabilistically significant failure paths. 
This selection process was accomplished with the branch-and-
bound technique. For details related to this method, the 
reader is referred to Ref. 18. 
This method was then successfully applied to a 
transmission line structure, and the dominant failure mode was 
found to be the side~sway mechanism of the top portion of the 
structure. 
2.3.3.5 Newfoundland transmission line failure 
Two major line failures occurred in 1980 and 1987 to the 
transmission line which runs along the west coast of 
Newfoundland. As a result, The Transmission Design Department 
of Hydro undertook a detailed study on the assessment of the 
existing line reliability and the course of action that is 
necessary to increase the level of reliability of the line 
(19]. 
The transmission tower of interest is a suspension-type, 
guyed-v tower, which means the structure is in the shape of 
the letter "V". The study included the analysis of the 
existing and upgraded structure under various basic climatic 
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loading conditions. The upgraded structure was improved by 
modifying some members to carry unbalanced vertical ice loads. 
The loading condition of unbalanced vertical ice loads was 
found to cause failure and contribute significantly to the 
probability of failure. 
In this study, a total of nine load cases were 
considered. Seven of these load cases were related to ice-
only loading while the remaining two load cases were extreme 
wind and combined wind and ice loads. 
The strength of a member in the structure was taken to be 
a random variable and related to the nominal strength, Rn, as 
R=MFPRn (2.10) 
resistance, 
variability due to material, 
where, 
R= 
M= 
F= 
P= 
variability due to erection and fabrication, 
professional factor that represents the uncertainties 
in the strength theory, and 
Rn= nominal strength. 
The variables M, R, and P were assumed to be uncorrelated 
random variables, so the coefficient of variation of the 
strength, VR, could be approximated as: 
(2.11) 
where, 
VM= coefficient of variation of M, 
VF= coefficient of variation of F, and 
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Vp= coefficient of variation of P. 
In the reliability analysis of this work, some details of 
the procedure were not explained. The document states that 
interference between the strength, R, and stress, Q, (effects 
of various loads) was taken into account using the 
mathematical theory of probability (19). From that point, the 
reliability of the tower &rower was computed based on the 
assumption that an individual member fails either in tension 
or in compression mode. Therefore, these two events are 
mutually exclusive under a particular load case. Members were 
grouped according to the particular mode of failure and total 
reliability of the structure was given as: 
n m 
RTower = en Rei> ( II RTj> 
i .. 1 j•n+l 
reliability of an individual member, i, in 
compression, 
(2 .12) 
reliability of an individual member, j, in tension, 
total number of members under consideration. 
Assuming the load case events are independent, the 
estimate of the structure lifetime failure probability was 
given by: 
M 
~ P(N.) Pt · Li .1 ,J.. (2.13) 
i=l 
where, 
pf, i = 
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probability of failure given that the "load case 
i" occurs, 
probability of occurrence of this load case, and 
number of load cases. 
The results of this analysis indicated that the existing 
structure has an annual probability of failure of 0.0096, or 
approximately 1 out of 100. The annual probability of failure 
for the upgraded structure was calculated to be 0.0073, or 7 
out of 1000. 
An economic analysis was also conducted in which the 
initial cost of the line is balanced against the future 
failure costs. The final results indicated that shortening of 
the existing span by adding structures is the most economical 
solution for upgrading this line. 
The focus of this work is on the development of the limit 
state function, G{x}. The methods discussed in this chapter 
involve complicated equations and procedures to produce this 
equation. Development of the limit state function was 
accomplished in the next chapter, Chapter 3, by using a 
regression technique. 
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3. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCEDURE 
As shown in the previous chapter, numerous approaches to 
a reliability analysis have been documented. In this chapter, 
the method utilized to construct a fragility curve for a 
transmission line structure is developed. The calculation for 
the structure's probability of failure includes all possible 
failure modes that may affect the structure's performance. 
This analysis involves the following three steps: 
1. Determination of the failure functions for possible 
failure modes. 
2. Calculation of the probability of failure for each 
mode. 
3. Combination of the individual modes failure 
probabilities to obtain the structure's probability 
of failure. 
3.1 Development of the Failure Functions 
A failure function defines the point at which a 
structural element fails to perform its function and is 
expressed as: 
( 3. 1) 
where xi represents the geometric and material variables that 
affect an element resistance, R, and Q is an applied load. 
The resulting magnitude of G{x} determines the presence of a 
safe or failure region. For example, G{x} > o indicates a 
safe region, and G{x} < O denotes a failure region. 
Formulation of G{x} consists of using a closed form 
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solution. However, in most cases, this is a formidable task, 
particularly when dealing with complex systems such as 
transmission lines. Although some researchers have utilized 
finite element techniques (see Haldar (17) and Murotsu, et al. 
(18]), these techniques involve a significant number of 
rigorous analyses to incorporate the indeterminacy of the 
structure. 
3.1.1 Generation of data points 
Alternately, in the method proposed herein, G{x} can be 
derived by using a technique similar to a Monte Carlo 
simulation. This technique is advantageous because it does 
not require finite element analysis. In the following 
sections, the goal is to represent the failure regions with 
the minimum number of structural analyses and to use these 
representations to estimate the system failure probability. 
This method was developed using the principles described in 
Ref. 5. 
In this procedure, a set of data points on the failure 
surface is estimated. The size of the set of data points is 
arbitrary but must have more data points then the number of 
variables in order for the regression analysis to be 
performed. Also a larger data set will result in a better 
estimate of the failure function. A regression technique is 
then employed to formulate the failure function. Estimation 
of the data points on the failure surface was accomplished 
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using two similar methods . The procedure of these two methods 
will be outlined in the example problems in Section 3.4. 
3.1.2 Regression analysis 
Regardless of the method of generating the data points, 
regression analysis is required to develop the limit state 
equation. Each group of data points associated with an 
individual failure mode were analyzed (or regressed) to 
determine the failure equation, G{x}, for each failure mode. 
The regression analysis was accomplished by using the 
statistical analysis program SAS [9]. This program uses the 
method of least squares to fit the generated equations. An 
example input file for the SAS program is presented in the 
following example in Section 3.4.1. 
Each equation that was obtained was checked for 
independence between the residuals and the predicted values, 
and normality of the residuals. These checks confirm that the 
generated failure equation is an accurate representation of 
the data. 
3.2 Reliability Analysis: First order-second Moment Method 
As stated in the Chapter 2, the First Order-Second Moment 
(FOSM) method was used to calculate the probability of 
failure, Pf, for each possible failure mode, i.e.,: 
Pt=P(G(x}~O) (3.2) 
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3.2.1 Reliability index 
The calculation of the probability of failure involves 
determination of a reliability index (often called the safety 
index), B, defined as: 
(3. 3) 
where µG represents the failure function, G{x}, evaluated at 
the mean values of the variables, and aG is the standard 
deviation of G{x}. Equation 3.3 may also be expressed as 
(3.4) 
This is illustrated in Fig. 3.1 where the probability density 
function is shown for G. The shaded area to the left of the 
vertical axis is equal to the probability of failure. If the 
mean, µG, is moved to the right and aG is held constant, the 
probability of failure is reduced. Hence, increasing the 
value of B corresponds to a reduction in failure probability 
or an increase in reliability. 
The relationship between B and the probability of 
failure, Pf, can be established by approximating the 
distribution of G{x} as a normal distribution (7], hence Pf 
can be calculated as: 
(3.S) 
where t is the standard normal integral which can be estimated 
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pf 0 µg g 
I. B crG .I 
Fig. 3.1: Graphical illustration of reliability index. 
the available normal distribution probability table. There 
are several techniques to calculate 8. In this research, the 
Lind-Hasofer method [7,8] was used. Details concerning this 
method are given in the next section. 
J.2.2 Calculation of reliability index: Lind-Hasofer Method 
When the failure function, G{x}, is non-linear, problems 
are encountered in calculating the safety index, B. In this 
case, the FOSM methods account for the non-linearity by 
linearizing only a point on the failure boundary surface, 
referred to as the design point, {x*}. The procedure is 
iterative and involves recalculating the design point several 
times and linearizing G{x} at each point. 
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The Lind-Hasofer method is used in this study since it is 
the basis for most methods [6]. This method can be described 
in two steps: (1) transformation of the random variables, 
{X}, into a space of reduced variables, {Y}, by 
(3.6) 
and (2) measuring, in the transformed space, the shortest 
distance between the origin of the space to the failure 
surface. This concept is illustrated in Fig. 3.2 for a two-
parameter failure function. 
The reliability index, B, is defined as the minimum 
distance between the origin and the failure surface in the 
transformed space. The design point now becomes {y*} and 
represents the "most likely" point of failure. Calculating 
the design point requires solving a minimization problem. A 
numerical solution is defined by the following system of 
equations, with respect to the original variable space of 
independent random variables, {X}, 
{a) = A. [a xl {VG) 
{x•) = {µ xl- p [a xl {a} 
G{x•) = 0 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
(3.9) 
( 3 .10) 
in which {VG} are the gradients of G evaluated at the design 
G < 0 
FAILURE 
a.) ORIGINAL COORDINATES 
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G > 0 SAFE 
._ ___ G = 0 
SAFE 
DOMAIN // 
FAILURE 
DOMAIN 
b.) REDUCED COORDINATES 
,.."8 
Fig. 3.2: Original and reduced variable coordinates in 
reliability analysis. 
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point {x*}, and {a} is the vector containing the direction 
cosines of the random variables. 
The Lind-Hasofer method is slightly modified to account 
for random variables with non-normal distributions. This can 
be accomplished by transforming the non-normal variables into 
reduced normal variables prior to the solution of the 
minimization problem [7]. The transformation process involves 
the determination of the mean and standard deviation of an 
equivalent normal variable, µxiN and axiN• These are found 
under the conditions that the cumulative distribution and 
probability density function of the non-normal and 
approximating normal variable are equal at the design point, 
{x*}. This leads to: 
4> (4>-1 [Fx, (xj)] ) 
= ~~~~.;;__~~-
where Fxi(.) and fxi(.) denote the actual cumulative 
distribution and density distribution of the non-normal 
variable, Xi . 
An iterative procedure to calculate the reliability 
index, B, is summarized in Ref. 7 as follows: 
1. Define the limit state function [Eq. (3.1)]. 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
2. Approximate an initial value of the reliability 
index, B. 
I 
I 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
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Set the initial design point values {x*} = {µx}· 
Compute µxiN and a~iN for those variables that are 
non-normal according to Eqs. (3.10) and (3.11). 
Calculate partial derivatives, {VG}, evaluated at 
the design point, {x*}. 
Compute the direction cosines, {a}, from Eq. {3.6). 
Compute new values of {x*} from Eq. (3.7) and 
repeat steps 4 through 7 until estimates of {a} 
stabilize. 
* Compute the value of B necessary for G{x } = O. 
Repeat steps 4 through 8 until the values of B on 
successive iterations are within an allowable 
tolerance. 
When a satisfactory value of the minimum distance, B, is 
obtained, the failure probability, Pf, can be evaluated from 
t(-B). 
3.3 Multiple Failure Functions 
The previous sections describe the generation of the 
failure functions, G{x}, and the calculation of the 
probability of failure from G{x}. In this section, the 
computation of the structural probability of failure is 
discussed. 
Once the failure modes and associated probabilities are 
established, the system probability of failure is calculated. 
This computation involves the statistical union (U) of the 
individual modes of failure, i.e., the system failure 
probability can be expressed as: 
where n is the number of failure modes. 
35 
(3.13) 
The exact calculation of Pf requires the determination of 
the correlations between all of the failure modes. If more 
than two failure modes are considered, calculating the 
correlations, and incorporating it into the probability of 
failure equations is a tedious task. Therefore, 
simplifications are employed to calculate upper and lower 
bounds instead of the exact probability. For example, 
assuming that independence among the failure modes, the upper 
bound failure probability is: 
n 
Pf= 1-IJh-P[F;J} (3.14) 
i•l 
for small P[Fi], the formula may be simplified to 
n 
Pf= L P[F;l (3.15) 
i•l 
The lower bound failure probability is calculated based 
on the assumption that the failure modes are dependent on each 
other which corresponds to th.e largest failure probability 
among the individual modes. The lower bound failure 
probability is shown below as: 
Pf= max P[F;l (3.16) 
For a large and complex structure, derivation of all of 
the failure modes including the modes that have a very small 
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probability of occurring, may be very time consuming. 
Therefore, one may consider only the dominant failure modes. 
This will not significantly jeopardize the calculation of the 
system calculation of the probability of failure. This will 
be illustrated in the ten-bar truss example in the next 
section, Section 3.4.2. 
3.4 Examples Problems 
3.4.1 Ten-bar truss 
In this technique, an iterative process to obtain a set 
of data points is used. The procedure consists of increasing 
the applied loads until a component in the structure reaches 
its structural ultimate strength. The structure is then 
modified by constraining the forces of the failed component to 
its estimated ultimate strength and reanalyzing the system to 
predict the next component to fail. These steps are repeated 
until a system failure is attained. 
This process also involves random generation of the 
system variables that define the strength of all structural 
members. Assuming a normal distribution, a random generator 
that utilizes the mean and standard deviation can be used to 
generate random values for the system variables. This step 
was accomplished using the normal random number generator in 
the Minitab software statistical program (21]. Minitab is 
also capable of generating random numbers with other 
r 
I 
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distributions such as the Weibell and Poisson distributions. 
The proposed method is a simulation technique but differs 
from Monte Carlo simulation. The simulation runs in this 
method are used to formulate the limit state, whereas in a 
Monte Carlo simulation the probability of failure is directly 
calculated. Also, the number of analyses in Monte Carlo 
simulation (in the range of 10,000) greatly exceeds the number 
of analyses used for this method (in this case 29). 
To demonstrate this procedure the ten-bar truss system, 
shown in Fig. 3.3 [8,22], was used. The basic variables in 
this example are the individual element resistances which are 
considered statistically independent and characterized by a 
normal distribution. The mean values of each element 
resistance, Ri, are listed in Table 3.1. A coefficient of 
variation for each element resistance is assumed as 0.2. 
Component failure results when the axial load in the 
member reaches the member ultimate capacity leading to 
failure. System failure occurs when the structure reaches an 
unstable stage. One should notice that failure of elements 1, 
3, 7, or 10 result in an unstable structure and hence a system 
failure. Therefore, the analysis is a lot simpler and must be 
concluded when any of these members fail. 
Reliability analyses of the ten-bar truss was 
accomplished by analyzing the structure 29 times. Each of the 
29 analyses resulted in one of five failure modes. Overall, 
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1 7 
~f<-~-1;..._~-5-f-~~2::_~---'lf--~~~~ 
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4P 
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Fig. 3.3: Ten-bar truss example problem. 
Table 3.1: Mean resistances for the truss elements in Fig. 
3.3. 
ELEMENT 
ELEMENT NUMBER MEAN RESISTANCE (kips) 
1 15 
2 15 
3 15 
4 15 
5 20 
6 20 
7 25 
8 10 
9 10 
10 25 
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there was approximately six analyses (or six data points) for 
each failure mode. 
For each structural analysis, a random number was 
generated for all of the elements' resistances utilizing the 
member mean and coefficient of variation in conjunction with 
the Minitab software (21]. For example, the element 
resistances for one of these 29 analyses are listed below: 
R1 = 12.61 kips, R7 = 30.11 kips, 
R4 = 13.19 kips, 
R8 = 9.82 kips 
R5 = 12.99 kips, 
For the listed resistances, the value of P (see Fig. 3.3) 
was determined by first conducting a structural analysis which 
indicated that element number 5 will reach its resistance as P 
reaches 1.18 kips. 
The structure was then modified so that the force in 
element 5 was constrained to 12.99 kips. The analysis was 
continued by increasing the value of P until another 
element(s) failed. In this example, it was determined that 
element 4 would reach its capacity as the value of P reaches 
1.27 kips. No further analysis could be performed since 
failure of element 4 results in an unstable structure. 
The data points associated with a particular failure 
sequence are grouped together. For the current example, there 
were five failure modes. The five failure modes and the 
respective variables used to identify the limit state equation 
for each failure mode are listed below: 
* failure of element 1 denoted by G1{x} 
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* 
failure of element 7 denoted by G7{x} 
* 
failure of elements 4 and 5 denoted by G4, 5 {X} 
* 
failure of elements 5 and 8 denoted by Gs,a{x} 
* 
failure of elements 4 and 8 denoted by G4, 9{X} 
The list of generated data points is located in Table 3.2 in 
which the data points are grouped by failure modes. Regression 
analysis of each group of data points was performed using the 
SAS software (9]. An example SAS program for the calculation 
of the limit state equation, G4, 5{x}, is located in Fig. 3.4. 
This program include the data points which are highlighted in 
Table 3.2. The output from this program is shown in Fig. 3.5 
and can be interpret by taking note of the figures indicated 
in Fig. 3.5. These figures are the estimates of the 
coefficients for the corresponding variables as denoted in the 
"Parameter" column, which is also indicated in Fig. 3.5. The 
SAS program computes the equation: 
P= 0. 0555694124 X4 + 0. 04167 08885X5 (3.17) 
The limit state equation has all the variables on one side of 
the equation, so rearranging and rounding of the variables 
results in the limit state equation for failure of elements 4 
and 5 as: 
G4 , 5lx) = 0.0556R4 + 0.0417R5 - P (3.18) 
The equations for the remaining failure modes are calculated 
in the same manner and are listed below: 
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Table 3.2: Data points for ten-bar truss example. 
P (kips) R1 (kips) R5 (kips) 
FAILURE OF ELEMENT 1 
1.16 10.40 12.75 22.85 25.29 8.05 
0.96 8.64 16.70 21.·05 30.09 7.93 
0.98 8.80 12.61 12.99 30.11 9.82 
1.09 9.82 16.42 20.56 28.09 8.61 
1.11 9.99 14.52 16.79 28.42 11.43 
1.44 12.99 17.65 20.29 40.22 11.03 
FAILURE OF ELEMENT 7 
1.38 18.00 16.09 18.41 20.67 10.11 
1.28 20.24 17.79 17.77 19.19 8. 38 
1.12 14.83 22.18 21.54 16.84 8.51 
1.41 18.15 13.30 25.40 21.21 10.00 
1. 38 18.85 19.06 22.78 20.62 12. 65 
1.50 27.13 20.95 20.72 22.56 13.07 
FAILURE OF ELEMENTS 4 AND 5 
.... . y ];~··4jL ..••.••. 1<.····i~•Jl$z.l··••<•:Id~o'it•· i i s}fcj·\··•· I.• >/~~·····<.c; •.. •···· 11.43 ... . 
···· · 1.sa. t >Ir•• >:i3L61Fr··, \ iiif.1.6 r < ··•·••· >~ :J;!io?··• ·• ··.•···~·o.;i2 ./ ····./.1.1.}03 ..... ····. 
·····•····<J..·50 <+s.(i?r . •·•·• >14<ab . /i~<l.2.······•·••·· .· .. ·····• $1.;$c;/ ..•..•. ·· {t.~.~ 
FAILURE OF ELEMENTS 5 AND 8 
1.49 15.00 15.00 15.90 25.00 10.0 
1.66 16.45 20.07 18.41 25.89 10.11 
1.53 20.71 15.40 17.77 30.29 8.38 
1. 66 14.94 17.59 25.40 31. 87 10.00 
1. 71 19.36 17.39 18.78 25.97 10.65 
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Table 3.2 (cont.) 
p (kip) R, (kip) R4 (kip) Ro; (kip) 
1. 61 
1.38 
1. 32 
1. 48 
1. 76 
FAILURE OF ELEMENTS 4 AND 
15.00 
12. 75 
16.70 
13.78 
17.01 
11 JOB 
//SAS EXEC SAS 
//DD SYSIN ** 
DATA FAIL45; 
15.00 
13 .12 
12. 69 
14.22 
15.20 
INPUT P X4 X5; 
CARDS; 
1.27 13.19 12.99 
1. 44 10.49 20.56 
1.43 13.07 16.79 
1.58 13.16 20.29 
1.59 14.80 18.12 
1.71 13.22 23.59 
1.67 13.85 21.54 
; 
PROC GLM; 
MODEL P=X4 X5; 
20.00 
22.85 
21. 05 
18.46 
22.28 
R7 (kip) RA (kip) 
8 
25.00 8.90 
25.29 7.05 
30.09 7.93 
23.85 8.92 
27.06 7.78 
OUTPUT OUT=NEW PREDICTED=YHAT RESIDUAL=RESID; 
PROC PLOT; PLOT RESID*YHAT; 
PROC SORT; BY RESID; 
DATA NPLOT; SET NEW; 
N+2; NS=PROBIT((N-1)/14); 
PROC PLOT; PLOT NS*RESID; 
Fig. 3.4: SAS program used to perform regression analysis. 
43 
General Linear Models Procedure 
Dependent Variable: p 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F 
Model 2 0.14257569 0.07128784 99999,99 0.0001 
Error 4 0.00000000 0.00000000 
Correct~d 
Total 6 0.14257569 
R-Square c.v. Root MSE 
1.000000 o. 001011 0.00001543 
Source DF Type I SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F 
X4 0.01740105 0,01740105 99999.99 0.0001 
XS 0.12517464 0.12517484 99999.99 0.0001 
Source OF Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F 
X4 0.03116393 0.03116393 99999.99 0.0001 
XS 0.12517464 0.12517484 99999.99 0.0001 
T for HO: Pr > T 
Parameter Estimate Parameter=O Estimate 
INTERCEPT -.0002481606 -3.24 0.0317 0.00007660 
I~! 0.65556§41241 11443. 77 0.0001 o. 00000486 0.041670888~ 22935. 13 0.0001 0.00000182 
Fig. 3.5: Output from SAS program in Fig. 3.4 used to develop 
the limit state equation, G4, 5 {x}. 
(3.19) 
G7 {x) = 0. 067 R, - P (3.20) 
G5 , 8{x) = 0. 0624 R5 + 0. 05R8 - P (3.21) 
G4 , 8{x) = 0 .1624R4 + 0 .101R8 - P (3.22) 
Knowing the failure function for each mode, one can 
calculate the probability of failure, Pf, utilizing the FOSM 
method (see Section 3.2). A spreadsheet was used to for these 
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calculations which is shown in Fig. 3.6. The spreadsheet 
shown was used for the failure equation, G4, 5{x}. Under the 
heading "ENTERED PARAMETER.S", the value for the load, in this 
case P, is entered. Then the initial guess for beta is 
entered. Convergence of the "Alpha_xx" variables indicate 
that no more iterations are required. This spreadsheet shows 
three iterations, which is all that is necessary in this 
example, but for more complicated equations, more iterations 
may be necessary. After the "Alpha_xx" variables converged, 
EQUATION: G(X} = 0.0556 X_4 + 0.0417 x_s - p 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES ******************************************* 
MEAN_X4 15 SIGMA_X4 3 
MEAN_XS 20 SIGMA_XS 4 
******************************************************************* 
EQUATION VARIABLES 
CONSTANT 
X4 
************************************************ 
0 
0.0556 
XS 0.0417 
******************************************************************* 
ENTERED PARAMETERS ************************************************ 
p ; l 
Initial Beta = 2.83 
CALCULATED BETA *************************************************** 
BETA= 2.83 
CALCULATIONS *****************************~************************ 
X_4* IS x 
-·· 
9.00 x _4• 9.00 
X_5* 20 x _s• 12.00 x 
-
s• 12.00 
dG/X4 0.0556 dG/X4 0.0556 dG/X4 0.0556 
dG/XS 0.0417 dG/XS 0.0417 dG/XS 0.0417 
Lamba= 4.2392 Lamba= 4.2392 Lamba= 4.2392 
Alpha_X4 0.7071 Alpha_X4 0.7071 Alpha_X4 0.7071 
Alpha_ XS 0.7071 Alpha_x5 0.7071 Alpha_xs 0.7071 
FIRST ITERATION SECOND ITERATION THIRD ITERATION 
***************************************************************** 
Fig. 3.6: Spreadsheet for calculation of beta. 
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then the task is to change the "Initial Beta" until it 
converges with the calculated "BETA". For a linear equation 
such as G4, 5{x}, the "Initial Beta" does not alter the 
calculation of "BETA", but for more complex equations, this 
step is necessary. 
The bounds of the failure probability can then be 
estimated using Eqs. (3.15) and (3.16) (see Sections 3.3). 
The results of this analysis are compared to the results 
obtained by Knapp (8) who used 19 failure modes (see Fig. 
3. 7) • 
The proposed method to calculate a system failure 
probability while considering fewer failure modes proves to be 
close to the estimations obtained in (8). This demonstrates 
that one needs to use only the dominate failure modes to 
obtain the fragility curve for the structure. 
In the technique demonstrated above, the user needs not 
know the failure sequence prior to analyzing a structure. 
Therefore, in order to group together enough data points for a 
specific failure mode, the values of some of the randomly 
generated variables can be "directed", (i.e. weakened or 
strengthened). More specifically, the weakening or 
strengthening of a variable means that the mean value is 
increased or reduced in the random number generator as a way 
of forcing certain failure paths. 
The use of the "directing" technique does not guarantee 
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Fig. 3.7: Fragility curve for ten-bar truss example. 
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that all failure modes with high-probability will be 
identified and included in the analysis. This is a 
disadvantage of this procedure. Also the user is expected to 
interpret the information from the structural and statistical 
analyses and to recognize which elements to "direct" either by 
weakening or strengthening. As a result of this disadvantage, 
the technique listed below was examined, which is a more 
systematic way to identify the failure modes. 
3.4.2 Portal frame 
This approach for generating data points on the failure 
surface is more specific than Method 1. Instead of generating 
resistance variables, the applied loads were randomly 
generated. Then, the structural analyses were performed, and 
the resulting member forces were recorded. 
The user determines the failure modes needed for 
estimating the system reliability. In contrast to the 
previous method (Method 1), the failure modes were unknown 
prior to the completion of all the analyses. Some 
simulations using Method 1 resulted in modes that were not 
included in the probability of failure calculation. Method 2 
eliminates those structural analyses; therefore, less 
simulations were necessary to accumulate enough data points 
for the same failure mode. 
(The 29 analyses cited in Section 3.4.1 did not include 
the extra analyses which did not contribute information to the 
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example. Since the time for each structural analysis for that 
example is so insignificant, the irrelevant analyses were 
disregarded instantaneously and a count of them was not 
possible.) 
The above procedure (Method 2) is first demonstrated, 
then verified. The demonstration utilized the portal frame 
shown in Fig. 3.8 [8]. Verification of Method 2 was also 
conducted using the previous ten-bar truss example. 
In the portal frame example, elastic-perfect plastic 
material properties were assumed. Structural failure is 
defined when a collapse mechanism is formed. The random 
variables are the loads, P1 and P2 , and the plastic moment 
capacity of each element is Ri. The variable, Ri is the 
plastic capacity of the section located at the joints in Fig. 
3.8. The mean values and coefficient of variation for these 
variables assuming a normal distribution are listed in Table 
3 • 3 • 
The first step was to identify the failure sequence. For 
example, Fig. 3.9 shows all the possible failure mechanisms 
for the portal frame in Fig. 3.8 . To illustrate this method, 
the mechanism involving the beam failure (i.e., the formation 
of plastic hinges at location 2, 4, and 7) was considered . 
Next, random loads were generated for P1 and P2 using 
Minitab [21] (see Table 3.4). Ten values were generated for 
ten analyses. The loads were used to analyze the portal frame 
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2m 
4m 
Fig. 3.8: Portal frame example. 
Table 3.3: Mean values of the random variables for the 
structure in Fig. 3.8. 
VARIABLE MEAN c.o.v. 
P, 20 kN 0.05 
p? 40 kN 0.05 
R,' Ro 75 kN*m 0.30 
R3, R4, 101 kN*m 0. 30 
R~, R~ 
R~, RA 75 kN*m 0.30 
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Fig. 3.9: Failure mechanisms for portal frame. 
Table 3 4• Random numbers generated for P and P . . . , "? • 
Analysis P, (kN) p? (kN) 
1 20.00 40.00 
2 19.86 48.72 
3 21. 41 35.12 
4 22.83 25.27 
5 17.69 48.50 
6 28.39 35.49 
7 13.41 43.57 
8 11.75 47.18 
9 21. 22 25.60 
10 23.09 19.90 
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for the first iteration. The structure was then modified by 
introducing a hinge and a moment at locations 2, 4 or 7 where 
the largest of the three moments occurred. In this case, the 
evaluation illustrated that the first hinge will occur at 
location 7. The structure was then modified by introducing a 
hinge and a moment at location 7 (see Fig. 3.10). This is the 
ultimate capacity of the member at this location and was 
assumed to be varied for each analysis, so it was defined by 
the value calculated from this iteration. For example, 
considering Analysis 1 where P1=20 kN and P2=40 kN, the moment 
at hinge 7 was 57.44 kN*m, so this was the value of the R7 in 
Fig. 3.10. 
For the second iteration, the modified structure was 
subjected to loads P1, P2 and R7 with the values shown in Table 
3.5. The loads P1 and P2 were increased by an arbitrary 
amount of 2 kN from the first iteration; while R7 was kept 
Fig. 3.10: Modified structure for second iteration. 
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Table 3.5: Applied loads to structure in Fig. 3.10. 
Run P, (kN) p? (kN) R7 (kN*m) 
.... •· ...•...• { i> ,. < 22.,()b ) ·•········· i . \ 42;ho ·• >'-·-' •···• ... ··.·.•.. ·•· < '.·'- -.-. ·=· ,-,_ .. _ :- : ::::/<::,:::<: ... •• .... <s., .• ,... . •>• ··=··=: ·_:··· -·_., _.:. __ •.·.•.· 
2 21.86 50.72 65.47 
3 23. 41 37.12 54.28 
4 24. 83 27.27 46.47 
5 19. 69 50.50 63.10 
6 30.39 37.49 61.60 
7 15.41 45.57 54.15 
8 13. 75 49.18 55.92 
9 23.22 27.60 45.17 
10 25.09 21. 90 41. 69 
constant. After the analysis of the modified structure was 
completed, the structure was then modified by introducing 
another hinge at location 4. The evaluation indicated that 
location 4 was the next plastic hinge location. Considering 
only Analysis 1 again, the moment was constrained at this 
location to 67.83 kN*m (see Fig. 3.11). 
For the final step, the structure shown in Fig. 3.11 was 
subjected to P1 and P2 with the values shown in Table 3.6. 
Loads P1 and P2 were increased again from the previous 
iteration, while R4 and R7 remained the same, and the moment 
at location 2 was monitored. 
Regression of the data points in Table 3.7 was used to 
develop the limit state equation as described in Section 
3.1.1. Each row in Table 3.7 consists of one data point. The 
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Fig. 3.11: Modified structure for third iteration. 
Table 3.6: Applied loads to structure in Fig. 3.11. 
Run P, (kN) P? (kN) R7 (kN*m) R4 (kN*m) 
.• 
I 1 32.00 52. 00 ·• .• ·. 57. 44 ... 67.83 
2 31.86 60.72 65.47 81.46 
3 33.41 47.12 54.28 60.21 
4 34.83 37.27 46.47 44.82 
5 29.69 60.50 63.10 81.12 
6 40.39 47.49 61.60 60.79 
7 25.41 55.57 54.15 73.44 
8 23.75 59.18 55.92 79.04 
9 33.22 37.60 45.17 45.32 
10 35.09 31. 90 41. 69 36.41 
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Table 3.7: Data points for beam mechanism failure mode for 
portal frame example. 
P, (kN) p? (kN) R? (kN*m) R4 (kN*m) R7 (kN*m) 
32.00 52.00 66.90 67.83 57.44 
31.86 60.72 75.21 81.46 65.47 
33 . 41 47.12 60.92 60.21 54.28 
34.83 37.27 50.26 44.82 46.47 
29.69 60.50 77.18 81.12 63.10 
40.39 47.49 54.28 60.79 61. 60 
25.41 55.57 76.83 73.44 54 . 15 
23.75 59.18 81.88 79.04 55.92 
33.22 37.60 52.19 45.32 45.17 
35.09 31.90 44.98 36.41 41. 69 
regression analysis resulted with the following failure 
equation, G7 , 4, 2 {x}: 
(3.23) 
By comparison, the failure equation, G' 7 , 4, 2{x}, listed 
in[S] for this mode of failure is: 
(3.24) 
which indicated that the procedure developed herein is capable 
of reproducing the same failure equation, and validates Method 
2. 
Another validation of Method 2 was accomplished using the 
previous ten-bar truss example. The limit state equation, 
G4 , 5 {x}, for the failure of elements 4 and 5 shown in. Eq. 
(3.18) was derived utilizing Method 1. The limit state 
r 
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function for the same failure mode was again developed using 
Method 2. This failure equation, G4, 5{x}, was calculated as: 
G4 , 5\x) = 0.0556R4 + 0.0417R5 - P (3.25) 
Comparing Eqs. ( 3 .18) and ( 3. 2 5) reveals that methods 1 and 2 
are the same. 
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4. ANALYSIS OF A TYPICAL TRANSMISSION LINE 
The procedure outlined in the previous chapter was 
applied to develop a fragility curve for one structure of the 
recently failed Lehigh-Sycamore transmission line [3]. The 
structure chosen was Tower 281. This tower is one of several 
structures that were damaged on October 31, 1991 when a severe 
ice storm hit the central part of the state of Iowa (for more 
detail, see Chapter 1). 
To construct the fragility curve for the failed structure 
under ice loading, a computer model was used to analyze a 
portion of the transmission line utilizing the ETADS [2] 
software. The results were then used in the reliability 
analysis previously summarized to estimate the failure 
probabilities associated with the different failure modes. 
Buckling of the pole, plastic collapse of the pole and cross 
arms and insulator failure were considered. 
4.1 Finite Element Model 
In previous work [1,3], detailed models of transmission 
lines consisting of several structures were used to analyze 
failed transmission lines to estimate the failure loads. In 
this study, a similar but simplified model was utilized. The 
model used included only one tower on each side of.Tower 281 
and is referred to hereafter as Model 1 (see Fig. 4.1). This 
is only an approximate model of a transmission line segment, 
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Tower-280 Tower-281 Tower-282 
Fig. 4.1: Model 1 computer model. 
but is only used to demonstrate a reliability analysis. 
However, if more accurate results are desired, a transmission 
line model that includes more structures must be used (3]. 
In idealizing the structures shown in Fig. 4.1, a fine 
mesh of elements was used to model Tower 281. A large 
displacement elastic analysis was performed. Linear material 
behavior was considered to reduce the computational time. 
The effects of material nonlinearity was included in a 
model that consisted of one structure. This model is referred 
to hereafter as Model 2. In this model, the conductor was 
excluded and the forces at the conductor-insulator connections 
obtained from analyzing Model 1 were used as input to analyze 
Model 2. 
4.2 Modelling Assumptions of the Transmission Line system 
4.2.1 Geometry 
Figure 4.2 illustrates a typical transmission line 
structure of the failed line. The towers are H-frame 
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OA IA OA 
LEGEND 
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Item Description section 
TL Tower pole 0 
IA Inboard arm 0 
OA Outboard arm 0 
SM Static mast 0 
XB X-Braclngs 0 
BP Bearing plate 
TL TL I Insulator Assembly 
GROUND 
BP BP 
Fig. 4.2: A typical transmission line structure. 
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structures built using hollow tubular steel members. The 
structure was assumed to have a fixed base support at the 
ground level. 
The dimensions and cross-sec.tional properties for Tower 
281 are illustrated in Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4. However, the 
hexagonal section of the cross-arm was idealized in the model 
with an equivalent uniform octagonal section with the same 
inertia and cross-sectional area. 
The insulator assembly is shown in Fig. 4.5. This 
assembly consists of several hardware components with varying 
cross-sectional dimensions. Because the insulator units are 
allowed to rotate relative to another, its flexural stiffness 
was neglected in the finite element model. Hence, these 
insulators were modelled as catenary cable elements. 
Figure 4.6 illustrates the joint where the inboard arm, 
outboard arm, static mast and the tower pole are connected. 
This complex joint was simplified in the finite element 
idealization assuming a rigid connection also shown in Fig. 
4.6. 
A plan view of one span showing the conductors and shield 
wires modelled in Model 1 is illustrated in Fig. 4.7. The 
figure shows that there were three groups of conductors 
corresponding to three phases and two shield wires in each of 
the spans. The bundled conductor for each phase had two 
conducting wires attached to the structure insulators through 
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222 ln.~ 222 In. 
390 rn. 
I 4"" 
~ 240 In. 
-i 
348 In. 
-+ ~"· 
276 In. 
I 
Fig. 4.3: Dimensions for Tower 281. 
Ha. (a- 19 In., b•12.7 In., t•6/1S In.) 
Hex. (c•13 In., b-8.7 !n., l•3/1S h.) 
Oct. (D•1J.1 In., t•t/4 In.) 
Oct. Section 
8 
Oct. (0•15.4 In., t•1/4 h.) 
OcL (O•IS.7 In., t•1/4 h.) 
t 
Hex. Section 
~ Oct. (0•21.9 In., t•1/4 h.) 
t a 
~ 4d Oct. (0•24.2 In., t•5/18 in.) 
Fig. 4.4: Cross-sectional properties for Tower 281. 
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in the finite element model. 
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Fig. 4.6: A typical joint of the inboard arm, outboard arm, 
static mast and tower leg; a) elevation and top view 
of joint, b) finite element idealization of the joint. 
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<",___ ___ ___.) 
TOWEA-97 TOWEA-98 
Fig. 4.7: Plan view of a typical span of conductors and 
shield wires. 
a yoke plate as shown in Fig. 4.8. For simplification in 
modelling the structure, the yoke plates were not included, 
and the two conducting wires were connected directly to the 
insulators. 
The poles of the structure contained three sections 
spliced and welded together as shown in Fig. 4.9. In 
modelling this joint, continuity between these sections was 
assumed. structure bracings were assumed to carry only axial 
loads. 
Figure 4.10 shows the location of the nodes within the 
finite element models for Tower 281 used in both Model 1 and 
Model 2 with the exception that Model 2 did not include the 
insulators. The other two structures in Model 1 were 
identical to Tower 281. The locations of the applied 
INSUl.ATOA 
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ISOMETRIC VIEWS 
YOKE PLATE 
IDEALIZED 
Fig. 4.8: Attachment of the bundled conductor with the 
structure insulator and its idealization. 
FIILD PLUG WILD SLOTS 
(POR FIELD ACCIPTANCI. 
l" OailllTATIOll OLD TO Bl 
Oii SAMI SIDI OF POLI) 
Fig. 4.9: Splicing and welding of the two sections of the 
main leg. 
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CONDUCTORS ATIACHED AT NODES 82, 85 & BB 
39 
BB 
Fig. 4.10: Location of nodes within the finite element models for Tower 281. 
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forces in Model 2 are shown in Fig. 4.11. 
4.2.2 Loads 
Overhead electric transmission line structural systems, 
in general, respond nonlinearly to applied loads. The 
magnitude of the nonlinearity varies depending on the loads 
and structural component and type. The transmission 
structures encountered in this study are classified as steel 
pole structures which are designed to resist relatively small 
loads acting in the direction of the conductors from stringing 
conditions. Therefore, then structures may undergo large 
deformations under relatively small load imbalances requiring 
consideration of large deformation in the analysis. This was 
accomplished in the ETADS program using the available "large 
displacement" option. 
As mentioned previously, elastic material was used in 
Model 1, and inelastic material behavior was used in Model 2. 
The non-linear material stress-strain relationship used is a 
bilinear elastic-plastic relation (see Fig. 4.12). The 
stress-strain relationship was defined by the elastic and 
inelastic modulus, E and Et, respectively. The inelastic 
modulus, Et, was assumed to be 0.035% of the elastic modulus, 
E, to avoid numerical problems associated with the elastic-
perfect plastic stress-strain relationship. The value of 
0.035% was arbitrarily chosen. 
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Fig. 4.11: Location of applied forces for finite element 
model in Model 2. 
Et • 0.035'4 of E 
STRESS 
Ey STRAIN 
Fig. 4.12: Bilinear elastic-plastic stress-strain relationship 
used for the structure material. 
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4.3 Development of the Fragility curve 
The reliability procedure outlined in Chapter 3 was 
applied to an existing transmission line structure by first 
analyzing Model 1 under incremental ice loading. This 
analysis established the relationship between the ice 
thickness on the conductors and the forces induced at nodes 
31, 35, 39, 51, and 52 (see Fig. 4.11). These forces were 
then used as an input to perform the structural analysis of 
Model 2. The analysis was continued and all possible failure 
modes such as buckling, plastic collapse and insulator failure 
were investigated. 
4.3.1 Results of model 1 analysis 
Model 1 was loaded in increments of 0.1 in. of ice until 
2.0 in. of ice on the conductors was accumulated. The global 
components of the forces (see Fig. 4.10) at nodes 31, 35, 39, 
51 and 52 were recorded. The results of this analysis are 
shown in Table 4.1. 
As would be expected, there is a non-linear relationship 
between the accumulation of ice and the forces on the 
structure. Also, the predominate direction of the resulting 
forces is in the vertical in-plane direction (or Fy) due to 
the weight of the ice and conductors. These forces, Fy, are 
negative because of the defined coordinate system shown in 
Fig. 4.10. 
69 
Table 4.1: Forces at nodes 31, 35, 39, 51 and 52 due to 
various ice thicknesses on the conductors. 
NODES 31, 35, & 39 
ICE 
THICKNESS Fy(a) pz(b) 
(in.) (kips) (kips) 
o.o -3.19 0.01 
0.1 -3.59 0.02 
0.2 -4.05 0.03 
0.3 -4.58 0.05 
0.4 -5.17 0.07 
0.5 -5.84 0.09 
0.6 -6.56 0.12 
0.7 -7.35 0.16 
0.8 -8.20 0.21 
0.9 -9.12 0.27 
1. 0 -10.11 0.34 
1.1 -11.16 0.43 
1. 2 -12.27 0.53 
1. 3 -13.45 0.65 
1.4 -14.69 0.79 
1.5 -15.99 0.95 
1. 6 -17.36 1.13 
1. 7 -18.79 1.34 
1.8 -20.28 1.58 
1.9 -21. 84 1. 84 
2.0 -23.45 2.14 
(a) Vertical in-plane loading 
(b) Lateral out-of-plane loading 
NODES 51 & 52 
Fy(a) Fz (b) 
(kips) (kips) 
-0.35 0.09 
-0.43 0.11 
-0.53 0.13 
-0.67 0.17 
-0.84 0.21 
-1. 04 0.25 
-1. 28 0.30 
-1. 54 0.36 
-1. 84 0.43 
-2.17 0.50 
-2.53 0.58 
-2.93 0.65 
-3.35 0.73 
-3.81 0.82 
-4.30 0.91 
-4.83 1.01 
-5.38 1.10 
-5.97 1.19 
-6.60 1. 28 
-7.25 1. 36 
-7.94 1.45 
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4.3.2 Buckling failure 
The buckling analysis considered only the forces acting 
vertically assuming that there was no longitudinal direction 
imbalance forces. This analysis was accomplished using Model 
2. 
The buckling analysis option was used, and the forces in 
the vertical in-plane direction corresponding to 2 in. of ice 
on the conductors was input as applied loads. Classical 
Eigenbuckling Analysis was used to determine the critical load 
or loads. Actually, the applied load is arbitrary since the 
analysis gives a load multiplier to find the critical loads 
based on the applied loads. 
The result of the eigenbuckling analysis was used as the 
mean value of the variable, xv, which represents the sum of 
the vertical forces acting on the structure. 
The regression analysis outlined in Chapter 3 was 
performed using the variables, xice (which represents ice 
thickness) and xv (which represents the sum of the forces in 
the vertical in-plane direction). These variables were 
obtained from Table 4.1. For example, when the xice equals 0.5 
in., xv equals the sum of Fy at nodes 31, 35, 39, 51 and 52 
is: 
xv=5. 84 +5. 84 +5. 84 +l. 04 +1. 04 =19 .60 kips (4.1) 
Only the magnitude of the Fy forces is used, so the values for 
xv are all positive. The SAS statistical software was 
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utilized to perform the analysis and to formulate the failure 
function, G8 {x} using the data points which consist of the 
variables xice and xv. This analysis yielded the following 
failure function: 
(4.2) 
4 . 3.3 Insulator failure 
Failure of any of the three insulators can also be 
induced by a heavy ice accumulation on the conductors. The 
axial force in the conductors, Xa, i.e., Fy in Table 4.1. 
The data points for the regression analysis consisted of 
the variables, xice (from the previous failure mode) and xa. A 
regression analysis of these data points using SAS was 
performed and the resulting failure function for the 
insulator, Gr{X}, is: 
Gz(x}= 3. 05 + 3. 66 Xice+ 3. 26 xfc9 -Xa (4.3) 
This equation represents the failure of a single insulator and 
was used to describe all three failures. 
Failure of an insulator does not necessarily constitute 
failure of the structure, but should be considered as one 
possible failure mode. 
f 
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4.3.4 Plastic mechanism failures 
4.3.4.1 Plastic mechanism of cross arm 
This failure mode deals with the formation of a plastic 
mechanism that results in a large rotation leading to 
structural collapse. Previous analysis performed in Refs. 1 
and 3 showed that the first plastic hinge will form at the 
cross arm-pole connection (see Fig. 4.13). 
In this work, to simplify this failure mode, a simple 
cantilever beam was used to study the plastic mechanism of the 
cross arm. The resulting moments at the end of the cantilever 
arm are listed in Table 4.2 for various ice thicknesses. 
The regression analysis resulted in the following failure 
function of the cross arm: 
Fig. 4.13: Location of maximum moment on the transmission 
line structure. 
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Table 4.2: Moments at location between the cross-arm and 
pole. 
ICE THICKNESS MOMENT ICE THICKNESS MOMENT 
(in.) (in*kip) (in.) (in*kip) 
o.o 789.48 1.0 2325.1.9 
0.1 878.28 1.1 2558.09 
0.2 980.39 1.2 2804.25 
0.3 1098.04 1. 3 3065.88 
0.4 1229.00 1. 4 3340.75 
0.5 1.377.70 1.5 3628.82 
0.6 1537.50 1. 6 3932.22 
0.7 1.712.82 1. 7 4248.1.1. 
0.8 1901. 43 1.8 4572.23 
0.9 21.05.56 
(4.4) 
where, 
Gp{X}= failure equation for the formation of plastic 
hinge, 
= the moment at the connection between the structure 
arm and leg. 
This limit state equation applies for both left and right 
sides of the transmission line structure assuming symmetry. 
Therefore, this failure type includes two individual failure 
modes, one for the right arm and one for the left arm. 
As with the insulator failures, the failure of the cross 
arm does not imply failure of the entire structure. However, 
one must consider this mode when investigating the failure of 
the transmission line structure. 
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4.3.4.2 Plastic collapse of pole 
Plastic collapse of the pole may occur when an insulator 
or an outboard arm of an adjacent structure fails resulting in 
a large imbalance force. This imbalance situation may also 
occur when a conductor is broken which as illustrated in Fig. 
4.14. The figure depicts a broken middle conductor between 
Tower "B" and Tower "C". Such an occurrence is important to 
investigate because the resulting imbalance force may yield a 
domino pattern of failure. 
To investigate this case, Model 2 was analyzed 
considering vertical in-plane forces at nodes 31, 35, and 39. 
The sum of these forces is referred to hereafter as V. A 
horizontal out-of-plane force, H, at node 35 representing an 
imbalance force was added to the model. The analysis was 
performed four times considering various levels of interaction 
between the vertical and horizontal forces. The levels of 
interaction between the forces V and H are listed below: 
•H = 0.0 v 
•H = 0.2 v 
•H = 0.4 v 
•H = 0.6 v 
•H = 0.8 v 
The first interaction was studied in Section 4.3.2 when 
investigating the buckling failure of the structure. 
In the structural analysis, these forces were incremented 
following the guidelines of the limit analysis procedure in 
ETADS, while the induced moments in the poles were monitored. 
TOWER "A" TOWER 118 11 TOWER "C" 
Fig. 4.14: Force imbalance created at Tower "A" and Tower "C" due to a broken conductor between Tower "B" and Tower "C". 
..... 
CJ1 
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Since the pole is a tapered member, the locations of yielding 
was indeterminate and is not at the base of the pole as one 
may expect. When full plastic hinges form at these locations, 
an unrestricted rotation under any additional load will occur 
leading to an unstable structure indicating the loss of the 
structure integrity. 
Due to symmetry, the formation of a plastic hinge on one 
pole of the transmission line corresponds to the formation of 
a plastic hinge in the other pole. The failure equations were 
developed for· plastic collapse of five pairs of nodes (see 
Fig. 4.10), and those pairs are: 
• nodes 1 and 2 
•· nodes 3 and 4 
• nodes 5 and 6 
• nodes 7 and 8 
• nodes 9 and 10 
For convenience, reference to these pairs of nodes will only 
include the number of the first node listed. 
For interaction level H/V=0.2, the following failure 
equations were developed based on the moments obtained from 
the structural analyses: 
G~.2{x}= -75. 08 -26. 99 V-0. 206x1 *H+x1 (4.5) 
(4.6) 
G~' 2(x}=-51.43-24. 86 V-0 .20BX5*H+X5 (4.7) 
X1 = 
X3 = 
X5 = 
X7 = 
Xg = 
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try°· 2{x}= -33. 33 -22. 7 3 V- 0. 2l3X,*H+x, (4.8) 
G~' 2{x}= -18. 63 -20. 76 V- 0. 216 X,,*H+x,, (4.9) 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 1 and 2 for interaction level H/V=0.2 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 3 and 4 for interaction level H/V=0.2 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 5 and 6 for interaction level H/V=0.2 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 7 and 8 for interaction level H/V=0.2 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 9 and 10 for interaction level H/V=0.2 
the moment at nodes 1 and 2 
the moment at nodes 3 and 4 
the moment at nodes 5 and 6 
the moment at nodes 7 and 8 
the moment at nodes 9 and 10 
Similarly, the failure equations were developed for 
interaction level H/V=0.4 based on the moments obtained from 
the structural analyses: 
where, 
Gl 0.4{x} 
G30.4{x} 
(4.10) 
G~' 4{x}= -504 .19 -193. 61H2 +x3 (4.11) 
Gi·•{x}= -455. 28 -187. 07 H 2 +x5 (4.12) 
c,0 • 4{x}= -347. 67 -173 .19 H 2 +x, (4.13) 
Gr•1xl= -306. 44 -159. 90H2 +x,, (4.14) 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 1 and 2 for interaction level H/V=0.4 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 3 and 4 for interaction level H/V=0.4 
Gs0.4{x} 
G10.4{x} 
Gg0.4{x} 
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represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 5 and 6 for interaction level H/V=0.4 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 7 and 8 for interaction level H/V=0.4 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 9 and 10 for interaction level H/V=0.4 
For interaction level H/V=0.6, the failure equations were 
developed and are listed below: 
where, 
G10.6{x} 
G30.6{X} 
Gs0.6{X} 
G70.6{X} 
Gg0.6{x} 
( 4. 15) 
Gf ' 6 (x}= -727. 63 -132, 39 H 2 +x3 (4.16) 
Gi' 6{x)= -664. 72-127. 43H2 +Xs (4.17) 
~o · 6{x) = -56 O . 4 O - 11 7 . 14 H 2 + x., ( 4. 18) 
Gr 6lxl= -411. 08 -101. 45 H 2 +x. ( 4. 19) 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 1 and 2 for interaction level H/V=0.6 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 3 and 4 for interaction level H/V=0.6 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 5 and 6 for interaction level H/V=0.6 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 7 and 8 for interaction level H/V=0.6 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 9 and 10 for interaction level H/V=0.6 
Lastly, the failure equations for interaction level 
H/V=0.8 were developed and are listed below: 
G~' 8{x)= -1025. 35 -105. 05H2 +X1 (4.20) 
Gf ' 8{x)= -951. 63 -101. 04H2 +x3 (4.21) 
where, 
Gio.a{x} 
G30.8{X} 
Gso.a{x} 
G10.a{x} 
Ggo.a{x} 
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G~' 8{x}= -87 8. 61-96. 81H2 +x5 (4.22) 
~· 8{x}= -754. 79 -88, 32H2 +x, (4.23) 
Gr"lxl= -647. 13 -00. 44H2 +"'9 (4.24) 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 1 and 2 for interaction level H/V=0.8 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 3 and 4 for interaction level H/V=0.8 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 5 and 6 for interaction level H/V=0.8 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 7 and 8 for interaction level H/V=0.8 
represents the failure mode that occurs at 
nodes 9 and 10 for interaction level H/V=0.8 
4.3.5 Combination of failure modes 
The analysis outlined above showed that there are six 
failure modes for the undamaged transmission line structure, 
(1) failure under vertical load that causes buckling of the 
transmission pole; (2) three failure modes that are associated 
with the three insulators; and (3) two failure modes that 
results from formation of plastic hinges on the right and left 
of the cross arm connection, Equations (4.2)-(4.4) represent 
the failure functions of these listed modes. 
The remaining failure equations, Eqs. (4.5)-(4.24), are 
developed based on the broken conductor scenario, and are 
considered separately. This assumption was made because these 
last equations are based on different conditions than the 
first set of failure equations. 
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All of the failure functions used the Lind-Hasofer 
method (see Section 3.2.2) to predict the failure 
probabilities associated with each modes. Only the first set 
of failure functions, Eqs. (4.2)-(4.4), were combined to form 
upper and lower bounds on the probability of structural 
failure using the method in Section 3.3. 
Regardless of the equation, the reliability calculations 
require the definition of the mean and coefficient of 
variation of the variables used in the failure functions. All 
of the variables in this example have an assumed normal 
distribution, and the mean and coefficient of variation of 
these variables are listed in Table 4.3. 
A spreadsheet with the Lind-Hasofer equations integrated, 
was utilized to calculate the reliability index, B, that 
corresponds to different ice thicknesses. This spreadsheet is 
similar to the one described in Section 3.4.1. The 
probability of failure was then calculated using the standard 
normal probability tables. Figure 4.15 shows the probability 
of failure for the failure modes corresponding to the 
undamaged transmission line structure. 
The probability of failure of these modes were combined 
following the procedure outlined in Section 3.3. The upper 
and lower limits for the structure failure probability 
excluding a broken conductor case is shown in Fig. 4.16. 
For the remaining failure functions given in Eqs. (4.5)-
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Table 4.3: variables with mean values and coefficient of 
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undamaged transmission line structure. 
2.2 
(4.24), the same procedure was followed except that no 
combination of the failure probabilities was considered. Since 
these equations do not pertain to the same loading conditions, 
these equations cannot be combined to form an 
overall structural probability of failure. However, the 
probability of failure for the individual failure modes were 
found. Figure 4.17 shows the five probability of failure 
curves for interaction level, H/V=0.20, and Fig. 4.18 shows 
those probability of failure curves for interaction level, 
H/V=0.4. Figures 4.19 and 4.20 display the probability of 
failure curves for interaction levels, H/V=0.6 and H/V=0.8 
respectively. Figure 4.21 depicts the dominate failure mode 
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Fig. 4.17: Probability of failure curves for individual 
failure modes for broken insulator case where the 
interaction level is H/V=0.2. 
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Fig. 4.18: Probability of failure curves for individual 
failure modes for broken insulator case where the 
interaction level is H/V=0.4. 
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failure modes for broken insulator case where the 
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Fig. 4.21: Probability of failure curves for the dominate 
failure modes of the four interaction levels. 
Of each interaction level which are: 
1. For interaction level, H/V=0.2, the plastic collapse 
of nodes 9 and 10. 
2. For interaction level, H/V=0.4, the plastic collapse 
of nodes 5 and 6. 
3. For interaction level, H/V=0.6, the plastic collapse 
of nodes 1 and 2. 
4. For interaction level, H/V=0.8, the plastic collapse 
of nodes 3 and 4. 
4.3.6 Interpretation of fragility curves 
The fragility curve for the undamaged transmission line 
structure, shown in Fig. 4.16, represents the probability of 
failure for a given ice thickness. The ice storms in Mid-
Iowa, which resulted in the previous studies, produced an 
approximate ice thickness of 1.25 to 1.5 in. of ice 
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accumulation on the conductors. For 1.25 in. of ice, the 
probability of structural failure is 15%-45% based on the 
calculations made in this study. For 1.5 in. of ice, the 
probability increases to the range of 35%-85%. In this case, 
failure most likely will result from buckling of the line. 
This is true if and only if no broken insulator or conductor 
occurs. 
The probabilities of failure for the ice thicknesses of 
1.25 in. and 1.5 in. indicate that there is high chance that 
the transmission line structure would be structural damaged 
during an ice storm which produced this amount of ice. Based 
on this information, one might say that the structure needs to 
be strengthened. But if the ice storm only occurs once every 
so-years, then strengthening this structure may not be an 
economically wise decision. The fact that two of these ice 
storms occurred in Iowa within a span of 18 months does not 
indicate that these storms are typical of this area. There is 
a trade-off between the goal to prevent any failure and the 
cost of such a venture. 
Alternatively, Fig. 4.21 can be used to interpret the 
probability of failure for a given ice thickness; however, the 
probability of failure is not interpreted the same as the 
previous case. The resulting probability is the failure 
probability of a damaged transmission line structure, such as 
one with a broken conductor or insulator. 
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To exemplify this case, consider an ice thickness of 0.5 
in. The sum of the vertical forces is 19.6 kips (see Table 
4.1). Assuming an interaction level between the horizontal 
force and the vertical force as H/V=0.2, the horizontal force 
is 3.9 kips. This corresponds to a probability of failure of 
approximately 5.0%. But the chance of the transmission line 
structure having a broken conductor at 0.5 in. of ice is 
negligible. 
If the ice thickness was 1.25 in., which has a 
significant probability of the structure resulting in a broken 
conductor, the sum of the vertical forces is 46.0 kips. Again 
assuming the same interaction· level (H/V=0.2), the horizontal 
force is 9.2 kips. Based on the calculations in this work, 
this force corresponds to a probability of failure of almost 
100%. Realistically, this means that once the ice loads 
results in breaking a conductor, the probability of structural 
failure would be significant. 
Engineering economic analysis using these probability of 
failure curves, Fig. 4.16 and Fig. 4.21, would provide 
engineers with more data with which to evaluate the condition 
of the transmission line structure under consideration. An 
engineering economic analysis may be accomplished using 
methods described in Ref. 23. 
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S. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
s.1 summary 
The occurrence of two major ice storms in Mid-Iowa 
resulted in the damage and collapse of many transmission line 
structures. The first happened on March 7, 1990 and caused 68 
failed structures. On October 31, 1991, the second storm hit 
Iowa and caused the most destruction in Iowa's history. These 
events were previously investigated and analyzed by others to 
determine possible failure scenarios. The first ice storm 
analysis suggested that a probabilistic analysis needed to be 
performed. 
The design of transmission line structures typically does 
not encompass probabilistic theory or reliability concepts 
such as Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRFD) that has been 
recently adopted in design of steel buildings. However, some 
reliability based design methods for transmission lines have 
been developed; two methods were proposed by the American 
Society of civil Engineers and International Electrotechnical 
Commission. As designers use these procedures, the acceptance 
of reliability based design for transmission line structures 
should continue to grow. 
Meanwhile, the methods followed to perform a 
probabilistic analysis of existing transmission line 
structures are varied. The development of the required limit 
state functions for these procedures require knowledge of 
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closed form solutions which involves rigorous manipulations of 
equations for a transmission line structure. The reliability 
analysis procedure developed in this study does not require 
this knowledge. 
The limit state function needed to perform a reliability 
analysis was developed herein using a regression analysis. 
Once the limit state function was established, the Lind-
Hasofer FOSM method was used to analyze the limit state 
function and to estimate the probability of failure associated 
with the various failure modes and corresponds to different 
load levels. These probabilities were then used to construct 
fragility curves for the system failure probability. 
In this study, the load was the accumulation of ice on 
the conductors and shield wires. Four basic types of failures 
of the transmission line structure were investigated: 
• buckling of the structure poles, 
• failure of the insulators, and 
• formation of a plastic hinge at the connection point 
between the outboard arm and pole. 
• failure of the transmission line structure subjected to 
unbalanced forces due to a broken conductor buckling of 
the structure poles. 
Specifically, the last type of failure of the 
transmission line structure dealt with a broken central 
conductor. This condition resulted in the formation of 
plastic hinges in the poles of the transmission line 
structure. 
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5.2 conclusions 
The resulting fragility curves provide information about 
the existing transmission line structure. This information 
can be use to determine the condition of a structure under 
different loadings. The condition of a structure is 
interpreted by the probability of failure. 
The probability of structural failure was determined for 
an ice thickness on the conductors of 1.5 in. to be between 
35% and 85%. After the ice storm in Mid-Iowa on March 7, 
1990, the amount of ice on the conductors was recorded as 
1. 25-1. 50 in. The analysis of the transmission line involved 
in this ice storm determined that critical load of the 
structure happened when the ice thickness was between 1.50 and 
1.75 in. of ice (1). Based on this information, one might say 
that the structure needs to be strengthened. But if the ice 
storm only occurs once every 50-years, then strengthening this 
structure may not be an economically wise decision. 
Interpretation of the probability of failure data should be 
compared with the frequency of the loading in order to make 
judgements about the condition of a structure. There is a 
trade-off between the goal to prevent any failure and the cost 
of such a venture. 
5.3 Recommendations for Further Research 
The probabilistic analysis procedure presented in this 
study may be further investigated to include different 
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applications, more variables, the variability of more 
parameters and the uncertainty of the variables. 
Many other scenarios may be considered using this 
probabilistic analysis procedure, including different loading 
conditions, combinations of various loading conditions, and 
different types of transmission line structures. Various 
climatic conditions such as wind and the combination of wind 
and ice accumulation are possible scenarios. 
Some variables to incorporate into the analysis are the 
difference of adjacent span lengths between transmission line 
structures and the angle between structures. 
The parameters which were included in this work are ice 
thickness, plastic moment capacities of joints in the 
structure, and strength of the insulators. These parameters 
could be separated so that the geometric dimensions of the 
structure and material properties associated with the 
parameters could be included in the analysis. The inclusion 
of the geometric dimensions and material properties would 
increase the computations and structural analysis runs 
significantly, but the benefit would be the inclusion of the 
variability of these parameters in the analysis. Sensitivity 
studies would indicate which parameters have the most effect 
on the probability of failure. 
1. s. Gupta. 
structures 
1991. 
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